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Why Don’t You Take a Seat Away from that 
Computer?: Why Louisiana Revised Statute 14:91.5 
Is Unconstitutional 
PREFACE 
During the 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature 
amended Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5.1 This 
amendment came in response to Doe v. Jindal, which declared the 
2011 version of the statute unconstitutional.2 This Comment was 
written in the fall of 2011 and therefore is no longer applicable to 
current Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5.3 Nevertheless, 
it is published here because the issues raised by former section 
14:91.5 are not unique to that particular statute but instead are 
implicated in state laws about sex offenders and social networking 
sites around the country. 
The Louisiana Legislature made important changes in the 2012 
amendment to section 14:91.5. First, the name was changed from 
“Unlawful use or access of social media” to “Unlawful use of a 
social networking website.”4 Though not a substantive change, it 
demonstrates the transition in the law: from originally criminalizing 
most Internet access, to now only narrowly criminalizing sex 
offenders’ use of traditional social networking websites, such as 
MySpace and Facebook.5 That transition was achieved through a 
number of changes, which, taken together, likely render the new 
version of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 constitutional. 
Second, “intentional use of a social networking website” 
replaced “the using or accessing of social networking websites, 
chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks” to describe what 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by EVA CONNER.  
 1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012); 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 
205 (H.B. 620) (May 22, 2012) (West). 
 2. Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596 (M.D. La. 2012). 
 3. The Editors of the Louisiana Law Review commend this scholarship for 
identifying the problems in former Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 and 
for effecting meaningful legislative revisions to this previously unconstitutional 
law. While the 2012 amendments to section 14.91.5 resolve many, if not all, of the 
constitutional deficiencies highlighted by this Comment, this scholarship remains 
relevant because of its practical impact on Louisiana law. The Louisiana Law 
Review congratulates the author for contributing to these noteworthy changes and 
for providing a constitutional example for other states that wish to enact or amend 
their laws regulating sex offenders and social networking sites. 
 4. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 5. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
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constitutes the crime under the statute.6 By adding an intent 
element and by eliminating chat rooms and peer-to-peer networks, 
the Legislature greatly narrowed the statute’s Internet coverage.7 
Even more important amendments changed the definition of 
social networking website. An insertion now declares that a social 
networking website is simply a website whose primary purpose is 
“facilitating social interaction with other users of the website”; 
furthermore, to be a social networking website, the site must allow 
users both to create webpages or profiles available to the general 
public and to communicate between users using those profiles.8 
The 2011 version of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 
was much broader, forbidding sex offenders from accessing a 
website that met either criteria and including “a forum, chat room, 
electronic mail, or instant messaging.”9 
Additionally, the new 2012 version of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5 specifically excepts many websites that 
were banned in the 2011 version of the statute, including websites 
that only offer photo sharing, email, or instant messaging, purely 
commercial websites, websites whose primary purpose is to 
disseminate news, and websites of government entities.10 Even 
more importantly, the restrictions on chat rooms and peer-to-peer 
networks were removed in the 2012 revision.11 The removal of 
chat room restrictions is the most significant change, as that 
subsection banned any website allowing communication between 
users—a very broad standard.12 
Finally, although the last change to the law is beyond the scope 
of this Comment, new Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 
does not contain the subsection that gave probation officers 
discretion to waive any of the requirements of the law.13 
These changes to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 
likely render the statute constitutional under the Free Speech 
grounds addressed in this Comment.14 The new version restricts 
                                                                                                             
 6. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 7. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). See also infra Part I.C. 
 8. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 9. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 10. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 11. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 12. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 13. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2012), with LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). See also infra note 77. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
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the disallowed websites to traditional social networking sites, 
which is likely narrowly tailored to the significant government 
interest of protecting children from sex offenders on the Internet.15 
However, despite the changes to Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5, this Comment remains relevant to many other 
laws across the country, demonstrating that a constitutional avenue 
exists to protect children from sex offenders online. 
INTRODUCTION 
You went to high school with John Doe. You remember your 
senior year when John got in trouble because his girlfriend was 16 
and he was 18, but that was a long time ago. Last weekend, he was 
your cashier at the grocery store. You asked John how he was doing. 
He told you that because a new law had been passed in August of 
2011, he could not use the Internet anymore. He had to close his 
Facebook account, which he had been using for the past three years 
to communicate with his cousins who live in California. John had 
been very involved with politics in his hometown but could no 
longer access the candidates’ websites or follow them on Twitter. 
He could not get his news online anymore, but occasionally he still 
caught major stories on the local channels at five o’clock. He could 
not see the pictures of his baby niece on his sister’s photo-sharing 
website. John had to give up on his fantasy football team. He was 
fired from his job as a computer technician and now works as a 
cashier at the grocery store; it was the only job that he could find 
without using any Internet career-searching resources. His pay was 
more than halved. 
In the past two decades, laws targeting sex offenders have swept 
swiftly across America.16 Very few issues in politics are both as 
popular and as nondivisive as the protection of children from sexual 
predators.17 In the same time frame, the popularity of the Internet 
has skyrocketed.18 Social networking sites have grown even faster 
than the Internet as a whole, and Americans now spend almost a 
quarter of their Internet time on these sites.19 In less than a 
                                                                                                             
 15. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 16. See discussion infra Part I. 
 17. Brian P. LiVecchi, “The Least of These:” A Constitutional Challenge to 
North Carolina’s Sexual Offender Laws and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.18, 33 N.C. 
CENT. L. REV. 53, 55 (2010). 
 18. United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, 
INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
 19. Sarah Kessler, Americans Spend 23% of Internet Time on Social 
Networks, SOC. NETWORKING WATCH (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.social 
886 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
generation, the Internet has completely changed how people obtain 
information, interact with others, and conduct their lives.20 
However, there is a dark underworld on the Internet that is both 
dangerous and misunderstood.21 Many popular TV shows have only 
encouraged the idea that social networking websites are crawling 
with sexual predators: nefarious men lurking in the shadows, 
waiting for their chance to prey on innocent children.22 For example, 
To Catch a Predator is based completely on the theme of 
confronting and humiliating men who solicit sexual encounters with 
children over the Internet.23 Any child who came of age in the 
Internet era remembers the constant warnings from parents and 
teachers to stay away from chat rooms and to never give out his or 
her name or address, often with a warning about the murderers and 
rapists who lurk behind a virtual shield of anonymity.24 
It would be a mistake to minimize the dangers of sex offenders 
over the Internet or the tragedies that have resulted from their 
actions.25 However, strangers commit only 7% of child sexual 
assaults, not all of them initiated over the Internet.26 Protecting 
children from online predators is a legitimate and important 
government goal, although the numbers show that the media and 
entertainment industry have exaggerated the risk of sexual predators 
online.27 Those exaggerations have inspired a sweeping national 
trend of statutes that restrict or ban sex offenders from social 
networking sites or even the entire Internet.28 Citizens in most states 
with such statutes have questioned their constitutionality; however, 
the trend is so recent that most of the statutes have not been 
challenged in court.29  
                                                                                                             
 
networkingwatch.com/2011/09/americans-spend-23-of-internet-time-on-social-
networks.html.  
 20. See id. 
 21. Online Predators: Help Minimize the Risk, MICROSOFT SAFETY & SEC. 
CTR., http://www.microsoft.com/security/family-safety/predators.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2011). 
 22. See CSI: Crime Scene Investigation: A Thousand Days on Earth (CBS 
television broadcast Apr. 10, 2008); Series: Law and Order: Special Victims 
Unit, TV TROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/LawAndOrder 
SpecialVictimsUnit (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 23. Chris Hansen, ‘To Catch A Predator’ III, DATELINE NBC (Jan. 25, 2011, 
5:42 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11152602/ns/dateline_nbc/t/catch-
predator-iii/#.TrHoM0PiGU8. 
 24. Online Predators, supra note 21.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Jasmine S. Wynton, MySpace, YourSpace, but Not TheirSpace: The 
Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking Sites, 60 
DUKE L.J. 1859, 1893–94 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 27. Id. at 1860. 
 28. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 29. See discussion infra Part I.A–B. 
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Previous law review articles have addressed some issues with 
laws banning sex offenders from the Internet.30 Yet, no article has 
systematically analyzed the issue from the perspective of a 
traditional Free Speech analysis.31 This Comment approaches the 
Free Speech issues arising from laws restricting Internet access to 
sex offenders, particularly Louisiana’s recently passed statute, to 
conclude that, while narrowly tailored social-networking-website 
restrictions on sex offenders could be constitutional, the language 
of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 is overbroad and 
unconstitutionally infringes on Free Speech.32 
                                                                                                             
 30. See, e.g., Jessica McCurdy, Outcasts: The Exclusion of Sexual Offenders 
from Social Networking Sites, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1577 (2010); Wynton, supra 
note 26. Most have focused on questions of substantive and procedural due 
process, freedom of association, and ex post facto violations, instead of a time, 
place, and manner analysis for Free Speech. 
 31. Id. 
 32. The statute reads as follows: 
A. The following shall constitute unlawful use or access of 
social media: 
(1) The using or accessing of social networking websites, chat 
rooms, and peer-to-peer networks by a person who is required 
to register as a sex offender and who was previously convicted 
of R.S. 14:81 (indecent behavior with juveniles), R.S. 14:81.1 
(pornography involving juveniles), R.S. 14:81.3 (computer-
aided solicitation of a minor), or R.S. 14:283 (video voyeurism) 
or was previously convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 
15:541 in which the victim of the sex offense was a minor. 
(2) The provisions of this Section shall also apply to any person 
previously convicted for an offense under the laws of another 
state, or military, territorial, foreign, tribal, or federal law which 
is equivalent to the offenses provided for in Paragraph (1) of 
this Subsection, unless the tribal court or foreign conviction was 
not obtained with sufficient safeguards for fundamental fairness 
and due process for the accused as provided by the federal 
guidelines adopted pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006. 
B. The use or access of social media shall not be considered 
unlawful for purposes of this Section if the offender has 
permission to use or access social networking websites, chat 
rooms, or peer-to-peer networks from his probation or parole 
officer or the court of original jurisdiction. 
C. For purposes of this Section: 
(1) “Chat room” means any Internet website through which 
users have the ability to communicate via text and which allows 
messages to be visible to all other users or to a designated 
segment of all other users. 
(2) “Minor” means a person under the age of eighteen years. 
(3) “Peer-to-peer network” means a connection of computer 
systems whereby files are shared directly between the systems 
on a network without the need of a central server. 
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Part I of this Comment addresses the content and history of 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 and compares it with 
similar laws across the country to assist in the analysis of the statute 
and to offer contrasting examples of statutory language. Part II 
discusses the constitutionality of imposing post-release restrictions 
on sex offenders who have already completed their sentences, 
concluding that there are legitimate and constitutional reasons for 
the government to restrict the rights of certain classes, specifically 
the rights of sex offenders. Part III briefly discusses the specific Free 
Speech background relevant to an analysis of the issue. Part IV 
analyzes the Free Speech issues that arise out of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5, concluding that it is overbroad and that it 
unconstitutionally restricts Free Speech. Part V suggests how the 
Louisiana Legislature could amend Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5 to be constitutional. With minor changes, Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 could achieve the Legislature’s 
goal of protecting children from sexual predators over the Internet 
while also respecting the constitutional rights of targeted sex 
offenders. 
I. EXISTING INTERNET BANS 
A. The Nationwide Trend 
1. Introduction 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 seeks to keep 
specific subsets of sex offenders away from social networking 
                                                                                                             
 
(4) “Social networking website” means an Internet website that 
has any of the following capabilities: 
(a) Allows users to create web pages or profiles about 
themselves that are available to the general public or to any 
other users. 
(b) Offers a mechanism for communication among users, such 
as a forum, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messaging. 
D. (1) Whoever commits the crime of unlawful use or access of 
social media shall, upon a first conviction, be fined not more 
than ten thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with hard 
labor for not more than ten years without benefit of parole, 
probation, or suspension of sentence. 
(2) Whoever commits the crime of unlawful use or access of 
social media, upon a second or subsequent conviction, shall be 
fined not more than twenty thousand dollars and shall be 
imprisoned with hard labor for not less than five years nor more 
than twenty years without benefit of parole, probation, or 
suspension of sentence.  
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
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sites.33 It was passed with the intention of keeping predators from 
finding and seducing new child victims.34 Louisiana is not the first 
state to enact such a law, and the content of other states’ laws 
varies vastly.35 A look at similar statutes enacted in other states is 
valuable in pinpointing the Louisiana statute’s problems.36 
Across the United States, laws restricting sex offenders’ access 
to social networking sites can be analyzed along two axes: (1) to 
whom the ban applies, and (2) how much of the Internet it 
covers.37 Some bans apply to all registered sex offenders, while 
others are more limited, targeting only those who committed their 
crimes against children or with a computer.38 The bans also differ 
as to how much of the Internet they forbid.39 Some statutes ban all 
Internet access, while others are narrowly aimed at classic social 
networking websites like Facebook and MySpace.40 Most laws fall 
somewhere between those two extremes.41 
Most statutes that have been passed differ considerably from 
the Louisiana law, especially regarding whom they affect.42 When 
a law applies only to offenders still on probation or parole, the 
legal analysis differs from a law applying to offenders who have 
completed their sentences, even if the intent behind the laws was 
similar.43 For instance, New York’s statute does not apply to 
registered sex offenders who have completed their sentences but 
instead mandates an Internet ban as a condition of probation or 
parole for convicted sex criminals.44 Because probationers and 
parolees have limited constitutional rights, the statute faces minimal 
                                                                                                             
 33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 34. The intent of the Louisiana Legislature was not to ban sex offenders from 
the whole internet but instead to ban them from social networking websites. LA. S. 
JOURNAL, Reg. Sess., No. 27, at 550 (2011). 
 35. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 36. See discussion infra Part V. 
 37. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 38. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12 (Westlaw 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05 
(Westlaw 2013), invalidated by Doe v. Nebraska, Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV2366, 
4:10CV3005, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. Neb. Oct 17, 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
202.5 (Westlaw 2013).  
 39. See discussion infra Part I.A.2–4. 
 40. See discussion infra Parts I.A.3, I.C for statutes banning all or most of 
the internet. See discussion infra Parts I.A.2, I.A.4 for more narrowly construed 
statutes. 
 41. See discussion infra Part I.A.2–4. 
 42. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (Westlaw 2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
65.10(4-a)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2013); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)(1)–
(3) (West 2012). 
 43. Wynton, supra note 26, at 1869. 
 44. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-a)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2013); Wynton, 
supra note 26, at 1869. 
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legal challenges.45 Texas has a similar statute for probationers and 
parolees convicted of certain sex crimes.46 Minnesota’s ban applies 
only to those offenders on probation or parole that are deemed a 
high risk to the community.47 These and other narrow statutes differ 
significantly from Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5.48 
Only three states have passed statutes substantially similar to 
Louisiana’s: North Carolina, Indiana, and Nebraska.49 These statutes 
all apply to sex offenders who have completed their sentences and 
ban only certain websites.50 
2. North Carolina’s Statute 
North Carolina passed one of the first laws addressing the issue 
of sex offenders and social networking websites.51 That statute, 
which has goals similar to the Louisiana version, approaches the 
issue in almost the exact opposite manner as Louisiana: The 
restricted websites are narrow and well-defined, but the statute 
applies to a much broader class of people.52 The North Carolina 
statute makes it a crime for all registered sex offenders to access or 
create pages on any social networking website that permits minors 
to be members.53 For purposes of the statute, North Carolina 
defines commercial social networking website more narrowly than 
Louisiana.54 For example, North Carolina provides exceptions for 
                                                                                                             
 45. See infra Part II. 
 46. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)(1)–(3). 
 47. MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (Westlaw 2013). 
 48. Id.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-a)(b); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
508.1861(a)(1)-(3). 
 49. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12 (Westlaw 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05 
(Westlaw 2013), invalidated by Doe v. Nebraska, Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV2366, 
4:10CV3005, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. Neb. Oct 17, 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
202.5 (Westlaw 2013). 
 50. See IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12; NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05; N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-202.5. 
 51. Wynton, supra note 26, at 1860. 
 52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5. 
 53. Id. 
 54. The relevant portion of the North Carolina statute reads as follows: 
(b) For the purposes of this section, a “commercial social 
networking Web site” is an Internet Web site that meets all of 
the following requirements: 
(1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from 
membership fees, advertising, or other sources related to the 
operation of the Web site. 
(2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more 
persons for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, 
or information exchanges. 
(3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that 
contain information such as the name or nickname of the user, 
photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, 
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sites that are solely for “photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant 
messenger, or chat room or message board platform”55 or sites that 
are primarily for “facilitation of commercial transactions involving 
goods or services between its members or visitors.”56 North 
Carolina’s Internet restriction is much narrower than Louisiana’s, 
although it applies broadly to all sex offenders, even those whose 
crimes had no connection to the Internet or to minors and those who 
have completed their sentences.57 
3. Nebraska’s Statute 
The Nebraska law shares major similarities with Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5.58 Instead of a clearly delineated 
                                                                                                             
 
other personal information about the user, and links to other 
personal Web pages on the commercial social networking 
Web site of friends or associates of the user that may be 
accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site. 
(4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social 
networking Web site mechanisms to communicate with other 
users, such as a message board, chat room, electronic mail, or 
instant messenger.  
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5. 
 55. The statute is unclear about what the word solely means here. Many sites 
that offer email also offer other services. See GOOGLE—PRODUCTS, 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/products/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 
2011). Gmail accounts are linked to Google, Google News, Google+, Google Docs, 
etc. See also YAHOO!, www.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). Yahoo! Mail is 
also linked to many other services. 
 56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5. The North Carolina statute would permit 
access to many websites that the Louisiana statute bans, including the websites of 
political candidates, most news websites, craigslist, email websites, job search 
websites, and most websites that are purely for informational exchange like 
Wikipedia. 
 57. Id. 
  58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05 (Westlaw 2013), invalidated by Doe v. 
Nebraska, Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV2366, 4:10CV3005, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. 
Neb. Oct 17, 2012). The Nebraska law defines social networking web site as 
follows:  
Social networking web site means a web page or collection of 
web sites contained on the Internet (a) that enables users or 
subscribers to create, display, and maintain a profile or Internet 
domain containing biographical data, personal information, 
photos, or other types of media, (b) that can be searched, 
viewed, or accessed by other users or visitors to the web site, 
with or without the creator’s permission, consent, invitation, or 
authorization, and (c) that may permit some form of 
communication, such as direct comment on the profile page, 
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restriction applying to all sex offenders, Nebraska and Louisiana 
narrow those affected by the Internet ban but broadly define the 
terms controlling the website restrictions.59 The Nebraska law 
limits itself to those who committed sex offenses against children 
or by using computers but includes offenders who have completed 
their sentences.60 However, the actual restrictions are not well-
defined and leave the statute open to an overbreadth challenge.61 
4. Indiana’s Statute 
Only Indiana’s statute narrowly restricts both who is affected 
and which websites are banned.62 Indiana’s legislation applies only 
to persons convicted of sex offenses against minors, not to all 
registered sex offenders.63 The statute bans certain sex offenders 
from accessing instant messaging sites, chat rooms, or social 
                                                                                                             
 
instant messaging, or email, between the creator of the profile 
and users who have viewed or accessed the creator’s profile. 
Id. § 29-4001.01(13). 
The Nebraska law defines instant messaging as follows: 
Instant messaging means a direct, dedicated, and private 
communication service, accessed with a computer or electronic 
communication device, that enables a user of the service to send 
and receive virtually instantaneous text transmissions or 
computer file attachments to other selected users of the service 
through the Internet or a computer communications network. 
Id. § 29-4001.01(10).  
The Nebraska law defines chat room as follows: “Chat room means a web site or 
server space on the Internet or communication network primarily designated for 
the virtually instantaneous exchange of text or voice transmissions or computer 
file attachments amongst two or more computers or electronic communication 
device users.” Id. § 29-4001.01(3).  
Under these definitions, the Nebraska statute would allow access to most 
political candidates’ webpages, to many important news sources (the sites that do 
not permit direct communication between member profiles but instead only 
comments on articles), and perhaps even to email. However, the Nebraska statute 
states that those definitions are specifically for the purposes of the Sex Offender 
Registration Act, which does not include the “Unlawful Use of the Internet” law 
that is comparable to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5. See id. § 29-
4001.01; id. § 28-322.05. There is nothing to indicate whether Nebraska will 
analogize those definitions to its Unlawful Use statute; however, if it did not, the 
terms in Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-322.05 would be left with no 
definitions at all.  
 59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:91.5 
(2011). 
 60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05. 
 61. Id.; Wynton, supra note 26, at 1868.  
 62. IND. CODE § 35-42-4-12(a)–(b), (e) (Westlaw 2013).  
 63. Id. § 35-42-4-12(b). The statute does, however, provide an exception for 
those convicted of an offense while in a consensual relationship in which the age 
difference is less than four years. Id. § 35-42-4-12(a). 
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networking websites that permit access to minors.64 It defines 
instant messaging programs and chat rooms as software that allows 
two or more users to “communicate over the Internet in real time 
using typed text”65 and social networking websites as those that have 
members register, allow them to create personal profiles, and 
facilitate introduction between people via online communication.66 
However, the Indiana law specifically excepts email programs and 
message boards.67 The Indiana statute is the only statute that 
narrowly and clearly defines both whom the statute affects and the 
websites that it restricts, and it has not faced any constitutional 
challenges.68 
B. Doe v. Nebraska 
Nebraska’s law limiting sex offenders’ access to social 
networking websites, the statute most similar to Louisiana’s, is the 
only statute that has been challenged in court.69 In Doe v. 
Nebraska,70 the United States District Court for the District of 
Nebraska found that Nebraska’s Unlawful Use of the Internet by a 
Prohibited Sex Offender Statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. § 35-42-4-12(e). 
 65. Id. § 35-42-4-12(c). 
 66. The Indiana Code defines social networking web site as follows: 
As used in this section, “social networking web site” means an 
Internet web site that: 
(1) facilitates the social introduction between two (2) or more 
persons; 
(2) requires a person to register or create an account, a 
username, or a password to become a member of the web site 
and to communicate with other members; 
(3) allows a member to create a web page or a personal profile; 
and 
(4) provides a member with the opportunity to communicate 
with another person. 
The term does not include an electronic mail program or 
message board program. 
Id. § 35-42-4-12(d). This definition explicitly permits email and message board 
programs. It also would allow access to most political candidates’ websites and 
many news sources. Although it is more restrictive than the North Carolina statute, 
it still permits much more access than Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5. 
 67. Id. § 35-42-4-12(c). 
 68. See id. § 35-42-4-12. 
 69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05 (Westlaw 2013), invalidated by Doe v. 
Nebraska, Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV2366, 4:10CV3005, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. 
Neb. Oct 17, 2012); Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010). 
 70. Doe, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882. “People who are convicted of crimes, even 
felony crimes related to children, do not forfeit their First Amendment right to 
speak by accessing the Internet.” Id. at 911.  
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sex offenders no longer on probation or parole.71 After denying 
summary judgment on the Free Speech issue, the court tried the case 
on its merits to determine whether the statute was unconstitutional 
under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.72 The court 
in Doe asserted that even sex offenders who have committed crimes 
against children retain their Free Speech rights over the Internet.73 
The court cited the Eighth Circuit’s assertion in United States v. 
Crume74 that Internet access is a vital medium for communication, 
business, and learning and that any restrictions on that right must be 
narrowly tailored.75 The court also gave examples of situations to 
which the law would be applied and to which it might not be 
narrowly tailored, such the situation where a sex offenders would be 
banned from language-learning websites and blogs discussing 
political and legal issues.76 
C. Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 14:91.5 
From the day that it went into effect, Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5 has been a subject of contention.77 The Louisiana 
statute criminalizes the “using or accessing of social networking 
websites, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks by a person who is 
required to register as a sex offender” and who was convicted of 
certain offenses.78 Those offenses include indecent behavior with 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. at 901. The court stated that the Free Speech issue could not be 
resolved with summary judgment. Id. at 911–13. It also determined that the statute 
may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, id. at 913–21, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, id. at 922, while rejecting challenges based on 
double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment, id. at 921–22. 
 72. Id. at 908–09. Doe v. Nebraska, Nos. 8:09CV456, 4:10CV2366, 
4:10CV3005, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. Neb. Oct 17, 2012), is the most recent 
version of the case. It declares Nebraska Revised Statutes section 28-322.05 
unconstitutional, finding the Internet restrictions and disclosure requirements not 
narrowly tailored, the entire statute to be overbroad, and the criminalization of 
internet use too vague under the Due Process Clause. 
 73. Id. at 911. See also, e.g., United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that complete Internet ban was a greater deprivation than 
necessary for the charge of receiving child pornography). 
 74. Crume, 422 F.3d 728.  
 75. Doe, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (quoting Crume, 422 F.3d at 733). 
 76. Id. at 912. 
 77. The Louisiana ACLU filed suit against the statute on the day after it went 
into effect. Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596 (M.D. La. 2012). Although as of 
publication Doe v. Jindal is being appealed, in the case, the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana determined Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5 to be facially overbroad due to infringement of Free Speech and 
void for vagueness. Id. at 603–06. Furthermore, it stated that the limiting 
instruction that probation officers may oversee the Internet limits does not cure the 
vagueness issues because it does not have instructions for petitioners under 
supervision in other states. Id. at 606–07. 
 78. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
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juveniles,79 pornography involving juveniles,80 computer-aided 
solicitation of a minor,81 video voyeurism,82 or any other sex offense 
in which the victim was a minor.83 However, Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5 goes further than other states’ statutes in its 
definitions and in the restrictions that those definitions impose on 
everyday Internet use.84 The statute’s definition of social networking 
website is much broader than the definition in most other 
comparable statutes;85 it denies access to any website that “allows 
users to create web pages or profiles about themselves that are 
available to the general public or to any other users” or “offers a 
mechanism for communication among users, such as a forum, chat 
room, electronic mail, or instant messaging.”86 Almost all websites 
are moving towards increasing interactivity, especially political and 
activist sites, and, as a result, the statute bans the vast majority of 
the Internet.87 Some of the websites that appear to be banned under 
this broad definition include: CNN, ESPN, BBC, National 
Geographic, USAJOBS.gov, Monster.com, eBay, and Amazon.88 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 also bans sex offenders 
                                                                                                             
 79. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81 (2011). 
 80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (2011). 
 81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.3 (2011). 
 82. Video voyeurism is defined as: 
The use of any camera, videotape, photo-optical, photo-electric, or any 
other image recording device for the purpose of observing, viewing, 
photographing, filming, or videotaping a person where that person has 
not consented to the observing, viewing, photographing, filming, or 
videotaping and it is for a lewd or lascivious purpose; or [t]he transfer of 
[such] an image . . . by live or recorded telephone message, electronic 
mail, the Internet, or a commercial online service. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:283(A)(1)–(2) (2011). 
 83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 84. See infra Part II. 
 85. See infra Part II.  
 86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). See also infra Part II. 
 87. Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 912 (D. Neb. 2010). An almost 
complete Internet ban will have major consequences. Those affected will be 
unable to search for jobs over the Internet, which has quickly become to easiest 
way to find work, or they may even lose their jobs. 
 88. Complaint at 4–5, Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596 (M.D. La. 2012) (No. 
11-559), available at https://laaclu.org/PDF_documents/Doe_v_Jindal _081511.pdf. 
Other sites that would be blocked include: NOLA.com (website run by The Times 
Picayune and an important source of local news), FoxNews.com, Reuters, 
NYTimes.com, Politico.com, Newsweek, The Economist, The New Republic, 
YouTube, getagameplan.org (Louisiana’s official hurricane-preparedness website), 
Twitter, Gmail, Hotmail, Comcast, AOL, Hotjobs.com, Careerbuilder.com, 
LinkedIn, Indeed.com, Craigslist, eBay, Amazon, Zagat, Urbanspoon, Yelp, 
Consumerist, and “any other website that allows user reviews of products, 
restaurants, movies, books, or music.” Id. 
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from almost all political candidates’ websites, including the official 
sites of Barack Obama,89 Mitt Romney,90 and Bobby Jindal.91 Those 
affected by the statute would be banned from renting movies from 
Netflix92 and from receiving almost any news via the Internet.93 
Even basic informational or educational websites often include the 
creator of the site’s email address, possibly a method of 
communication.94 Although Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5’s stated purpose is to keep sex offenders off of social 
networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter,95 in 
practice it bans the affected registrants from most of the Internet.96 
In light of the increasing importance of the Internet, this statute 
would ban sex offenders from a vast amount of political activity, 
from career opportunities, and from the extensive knowledge base 
located online.97 It is necessary to examine the new statute in light 
of constitutional jurisprudence98 to ensure both that children are 
safe and that sex offenders’ constitutional rights are not 
                                                                                                             
 89. BARACK OBAMA, https://login.barackobama.com/account/new (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2013) (allows for the creation of accounts and communication 
in the form of comments). 
 90. MITT ROMNEY, http://www.mittromney.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 
2013) (allows for the creation of accounts). 
 91. GOVERNOR BOBBY JINDAL, http://www.bobbyjindal.com/ (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2011) (allows for the creation of accounts and hosts a blog with 
comments). 
 92. NETFLIX, http://www.netflix.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (allows for 
comments to be left regarding movies and TV shows). 
 93. Virtually every mainstream news website allows comments to be left 
about articles, and many also facilitate the creation of accounts. See Complaint, 
supra note 88, at 4–5.  
 94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). 
 95. LA. S. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess., No. 27, at 550 (2011).  
 96. According to the Executive Director of the Louisiana ACLU, Marjorie 
Esman, “banning access to all sorts of online information, without any 
connection to a crime or access to children, is using a bulldozer where a trowel 
would do.” ACLU Seeks to Block New Louisiana Sex Offender Law, CNN.COM, 
Oct. 12, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-16/justice/louisiana.sex.offender 
.law_1_internet-access-offender-law-aclu?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 97. Id. The extent to which this would inhibit sex offenders from finding 
jobs, joining support groups, and learning new information is especially 
concerning. It is particularly important to ensure that sex offenders, as a group, 
are reintegrated into society to avoid recidivism. 
 98. This statute will be analyzed under the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. The Free Speech section of the Louisiana Constitution is 
parallel to the First Amendment and should be interpreted in the same manner, 
so it will not be addressed. LA. CONST. art. I, § 7. Delcarpio v. St. Tammany 
Parish Sch. Bd., 865 F. Supp. 350, 362–63 (E.D. La. 1994), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184 (5th 
Cir. 1995). 
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compromised solely because they are members of an unpopular 
class.99 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POST-RELEASE RESTRICTIONS ON SEX 
OFFENDERS 
A. Background 
A North Carolina senator said, “When a person takes advantage 
of a child, I don’t worry about their constitutional rights.”100 That is 
a common attitude in American society.101 Few are as maligned as 
those who abuse children, and other registered sex offenders are 
often grouped with them.102 Politicians loathe to be labeled as lax on 
sex crimes, especially those against children, and face mounting 
pressure from constituents to pass laws protecting minors.103 Most 
exhibit little concern over whether those laws violate the 
constitutional rights of convicted sex criminals.104 However, the 
goals of protecting children from sexual offenders online and of 
upholding the constitutional rights of convicted sex offenders are not 
mutually exclusive.105 
One of the foundational concepts of the American system is the 
idea of fundamental rights.106 Although no rights are absolute, the 
                                                                                                             
 99. The ACLU lawsuit addresses the issue by stating that “[t]he statute will 
ban affected registrants from likely targets Facebook and MySpace. However, it 
will also make it a felony for registrants to browse the rest of the Internet, severely 
curtailing their First Amendment freedoms in ways that bear no relation to the 
state’s legitimate pursuit of public safety.” Complaint, supra note 88, at 4. 
 100. LiVecchi, supra note 17, at 55 (citation omitted) (quoting North Carolina 
Senator David Hoyle). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Rachel J. Rodriguez, The Sex Offender Under the Bridge: Has Megan’s 
Law Run Amok?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2010). 
 103. LiVecchi, supra note 17, at 55. 
 104. ACLU Seeks to Block New Louisiana Sex Offender Law, supra note 96. 
When asked about Louisiana Revised Statute section 14:91.5, Louisiana 
Governor Bobby Jindal said that “[i]f these people want to search the Internet 
for new victims they can do it somewhere else. It is frankly insulting for the 
ACLU to claim it is a convicted sex offender’s ‘First Amendment right’ to use 
Facebook, MySpace, and Craigslist.” Id. 
 105. Jan Moller, ACLU Challenging New State Law Banning Sex Offenders 
from Using Social Networking Sites, NOLA.COM (Aug. 25, 2011, 4:25 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/08/aclu_challenging_new_state_law.
html. Marjorie Esman of the Louisiana ACLU has stated about Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5 that “[k]eeping children safe is obviously very important 
to everybody. This is about the state essentially banning access to anything on the 
internet at all.” Id. 
 106. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49–51 (1961) (holding 
that the California bar could refuse admission to petitioner for refusing to 
898 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
government must always have an adequate justification to strip a 
person of his or her rights.107 To impose restrictions on sex 
offenders—whether a registration mandate, a residency requirement, 
or an Internet limitation or ban—the government must show that 
society’s interest outweighs the offender’s rights.108 It is vital to the 
continuation of the unique American system of law that public 
pressure does not outweigh the rights of those targeted and that 
society does not allow a collective distaste of sex offenders to 
marginalize the body of law addressing the core constitutional issues 
at stake.109 
However, the state can always restrict the rights of certain 
classes when it can demonstrate an adequate reason.110 Prisoners’ 
rights can be narrowly restricted111 because conviction and 
incarceration strip prisoners of rights that are “incompatible with the 
objectives of incarceration.”112 Probationers’ and parolees’ rights are 
also subject to limitation, although to a lesser degree.113 Conditions 
of probation or parole may infringe on fundamental constitutional 
rights but only when those rights are reasonably related to the 
punishment and when the restriction is reasonably necessary for the 
purpose of discouraging recidivism.114 
Whether the constitutional rights of registered sex offenders not 
on probation or parole can be restricted is a more difficult issue.115 
Generally, criminals who have completed their sentences are viewed 
as having paid their debts to society.116 However, some laws do 
impose continuing penalties on them.117 For example, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the disenfranchisement of convicted felons even 
                                                                                                             
 
answer questions about Communist Party affiliation because the right to Free 
Speech is not absolute).  
 107. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78 (1974) (stating that individual 
rights and state interest must be balanced when stripping people of their 
fundamental rights). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, VI. Prisoners’ Rights, 
89 GEO. L.J. 1897, 1897–98 (2001). 
 111. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984). 
 112. Id. (citations omitted). 
 113. Kenya A. Jenkins, “Shaming” Probation Penalties and the Sexual 
Offender: A Dangerous Combination, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 86 (2002). 
Parole or probation restrictions must be “reasonably related to the goals of the 
sentence and involve only deprivations of liberty that are reasonably necessary 
to meet these purposes.” Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Michelle Pia Jerusalem, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender 
Legislation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 219, 250 (1995). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 238 n.195. 
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after they have completed their sentences.118 In the recent decision 
in District of Columbia v. Heller, a landmark case that labeled 
Second Amendment rights as fundamental, the Court specifically 
stated that the holding should not be construed as overturning 
prohibitions on felons owning firearms.119 Furthermore, some courts 
have ruled that convicted felons are subject to additional restrictions 
beyond their sentences when there is a “reasonable relationship 
between the restriction and the need to protect the public from the 
type of behavior for which the felon was convicted.”120 Statutory 
restrictions on convicted felons include laws that ban certain felons 
from working in federal financial institutions,121 from holding union 
office,122 or from serving on juries.123 Restricting sex offenders 
from the Internet raises similar issues, and the necessary question 
is whether such a broad ban on Internet usage is reasonably related 
to the offense.124 
The next question is whether sex offenders can be subject to 
even more extensive regulations than other categories of felons.125 
Almost all courts have recognized some lowered level of 
constitutional protection linked to sex-offender status, as evidenced 
by registration, notification, and residency requirements.126 The 
Supreme Court has held that registration and notification 
requirements are constitutional for registered sex offenders who 
have completed their sentences.127 The state has a legitimate and 
                                                                                                             
 118. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (stating that disenfranchisement 
of convicted felons was not a denial of equal protection). 
 119. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (holding that 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms is fundamental guarantee to keep 
guns in the home). This case is a clear indication that felons can be stripped of 
fundamental rights due to their status as felons, even after they have served their 
sentences. 
 120. McCurdy, supra note 30, at 1581–82 (citing Hobbs v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, No. 00Civ.8170(JSM)(LMS), 2002 WL 31873462, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec 23, 2002)). 
 121. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (holding occupational 
debarment of bank officers for misapplication of bank funds constitutional). 
 122. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (2006); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) 
(holding ban on felons serving as union officers constitutional). 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2006). 
 124. McCurdy, supra note 30, at 1581–82. 
 125. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 126. Id. 
 127. The Supreme Court upheld registration and notification requirements in 
two cases. The first was Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84. The Court stated that the 
registration and notification law in Alaska survived a challenge under the Ex 
Post Facto Clause because its objective of protecting the public was nonpunitive 
and most of its provisions did not involve criminal punishment. See id. at 105–
06. Additionally, Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 
(2003), upheld Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute over a due process 
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nonpunitive interest in imposing restrictions on those determined 
to be dangerous, especially sex offenders.128 
However, constitutional analysis always involves a balancing 
of the government’s interest and the individual’s rights.129 The 
greater the burden imposed on individual rights, the stronger the 
government interest must be to uphold the restriction.130 Because 
registration and notification requirements were addressed and 
upheld, a number of states have begun to pass residency 
requirements that impose spatial limits on sex offenders’ homes 
and generally barring sex offenders from areas where children 
congregate.131 Those restrictions are vastly more burdensome than 
registration and notification, and lower courts across the country 
are split on their constitutionality.132 The highest court that has 
addressed the issue of residency requirements is the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which upheld Iowa’s residency restriction in 
Doe v. Miller.133 However, Doe v. Miller failed to address the 
constitutionality of imposing restrictions on registered sex 
offenders who have completed their sentences, instead treating 
their authority to pass restrictions over those offenders as an 
established fact.134 The court merely examined whether the 
particular restriction at issue passed the balancing test between 
citizens’ rights and governmental interest.135 
                                                                                                             
 
challenge. See id. at 8. The defendant challenged the Connecticut provisions by 
claiming that the Connecticut Department of Public Safety did not have a 
procedure to determine whether those affected were “currently dangerous.” The 
Court determined that the challenge was without merit; Connecticut had 
intended to register all convicted sex offenders, regardless of their danger to 
society, and all of those convicted of a sex crime had been given a chance to 
challenge their conviction at their trials. Id. at 6–7. In both cases, the Court held 
that, although the sex offenders completed their sentences, the government still 
had a strong enough interest in the restrictions that they did not violate the 
constitutional rights of those affected. 
 128. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997). 
 129. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78 (1974) (stating that individual 
rights and state interest must be balanced when stripping people of their 
fundamental rights). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Wynton, supra note 26, at 1882 n.110. 
 132. Id. Some residency statutes have survived due process, ex post facto, 
and cruel and unusual punishment challenges, while other courts have struck 
down residency laws based on equal protection and takings grounds. 
 133. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005). Iowa’s statute was upheld 
over procedural due process, substantive due process, and ex post facto 
challenges. 
 134. The only mention of whether the law should impact those sex offenders 
who have completed their sentences comes in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 725 
(Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 709–11 (majority opinion). The State of Iowa made the argument 
that it was “common sense” that separating children and sex offenders would 
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Both Internet and residency restrictions impose limitations on 
the actions of those who have completed their sentences, including 
probation and parole.136 Courts around the country, including the 
United States Supreme Court, have concluded that there are times 
when it is acceptable to impose restrictions on registered sex 
offenders who have completed their sentences in the form of 
registration, notification, and residency statutes.137 However, not 
all restrictions on sex offenders are valid.138 To pass constitutional 
scrutiny, it is necessary that the restriction be reasonably related to 
the crime committed and that the governmental interest asserted 
justifies restricting the constitutional rights of citizens.139 
B. Application to Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 14:91.5 
Applying the current jurisprudence to restrictions on sex 
offenders’ Internet access, especially in the context of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5, the government can likely single 
out sex offenders, even those who have completed their sentences, 
for some restrictions on Internet use.140 Although sex offenders do 
not have quantifiably lowered constitutional protection in the way 
that prisoners, parolees, or probationers do, precedent exists for 
government restrictions on those who have served their time.141 
Furthermore, precedent has also permitted the government to 
specifically single out sex offenders for restrictions, such as in 
registration, notification, and residency requirements.142 As noted 
above, as long as the state can show that the restriction reasonably 
                                                                                                             
 
lead to a decrease in child abuse caused by recidivism. Because there only needs 
to be a rational basis for the law to survive scrutiny, that common sense analysis 
is enough to make the law constitutional. Although residency restrictions are 
more restrictive than an Internet restriction, Doe v. Miller and Smith v. Doe are 
still analogous to the present case and have precedential value. Id. at 716. 
 136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011); Miller, 405 F.3d 700. 
 137. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Miller, 405 
F.3d 700; Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 138. E.g., Santos v. State, 668 S.E.2d. 676 (Ga. 2008) (holding that 
disallowing “homeless” as an address for registration violated the Due Process 
Clause). 
 139. Miller, 405 F.3d at 714, 720; Smith, 538 U.S. at 86–87.  
 140. See infra Part IV. 
 141. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. 1; Miller, 405 F.3d 700; Smith, 
538 U.S. 84. 
 142. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4; Smith, 405 F.3d at 95. 
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relates to the government interest of protecting the public from the 
crime that the class of felons committed, it should survive.143  
Restricting sex offenders, who committed their crimes against 
children, from social networking sites is reasonably related to the 
crime committed.144 Keeping child sex offenders from accessing 
social networking sites will help to keep them from reoffending.145 
However, just because it is legitimate for the government to single 
out sex offenders does not mean that Louisiana’s statute itself is 
constitutional.146 It is also necessary to examine whether the 
statute, as written, survives Free Speech constitutional scrutiny.147 
III. FREE SPEECH 
A. Free Speech and the Internet 
The Internet has quickly come to define modern society, and it 
has vastly and rapidly changed how people around the world 
interact.148 The massive amount of information on the Internet and 
the instantaneous nature of the Internet have revolutionized 
communication, interaction, and even political activism.149 Social 
media has played a large part in those developments.150 However, 
the issues applicable to the current matter have rarely been 
addressed in the context of the Internet.151 The overbreadth 
doctrine does not differ substantially in its online and offline 
application.152 On the other hand, Free Speech protection may 
differ at least marginally in cyberspace, but it has not been nearly 
as well-defined online as it has offline.153 In Reno v. ACLU, the 
                                                                                                             
 143. McCurdy, supra note 30, at 1581–82 (citing Hobbs v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, No. 00Civ.8170(JSM)(LMS), 2002 WL 31873462, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec 23, 2002)). 
 144. See infra Part IV. 
 145. Miller, 405 F.3d 700. 
 146. See infra Part IV. 
 147. See infra Part IV. 
 148. See generally Irina Shklovski, Sarah Kiesler & Robert Kraut, The Internet 
and Social Interaction: A Meta-analysis and Critique of Studies, 1995-2003, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., http://www.academia.edu/852624/The_Internet _and 
_social_interaction. 
 149. Important examples are the 2010 Egyptian Revolution and the London Riots 
in 2011. Community Team, Telling the London Riot Story on Social Media, 
CBCNEWS (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:55 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/yourcommunity /2011 
/08/telling-the-london-riot-story-on-social-media.html; Social Media, Cellphone Video 
Fuel Arab Protests, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.independent 
.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/social-media-cellphone-video-fuel-arab-protests-
2227088.html. 
 150. See Community Team, supra note 149; Social Media, supra note 149. 
 151. See infra Part III.C. 
 152. See infra Part III.B. 
 153. See infra Part III.C. 
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Supreme Court held that expression on the Internet, like that in 
print media, receives full First Amendment protection.154 The 
Court concluded that there was no legitimate reason to restrict Free 
Speech on the Internet as it had previously done with television 
and radio.155 Since the Supreme Court has rarely dealt with the 
issue and has done so only on a case-by-case basis, it is necessary 
to analogize from offline cases that deal with similar issues.156  
B. Overbreadth 
Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine established by 
the Supreme Court, a statute that bans a substantial amount of 
protected speech is void.157 As applied to Free Speech, the 
overbreadth doctrine protects the core ideals of the First 
Amendment by defending lawful speech, especially speech that 
either resembles unlawful speech or is suppressed in the 
government’s effort to ban unlawful speech.158 The overbreadth 
doctrine has been characterized as a balancing test that must be 
analyzed in light of relevant competing social interests.159 In Free 
Speech cases especially, ensuring that laws are not overbroad and 
that they do not ban protected speech is paramount.160 A law that 
                                                                                                             
 154. 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (holding that a ban on transmission of obscene 
material to minors over the Internet was content based and thus received strict 
scrutiny and also that it was overbroad). 
 155. Id. (stating that “our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium” because 
people seek out content on the Internet themselves, instead of turning it on and 
possibly being surprised by obscene content, as could happen with a television 
or radio). 
 156. Id. See also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37 (1983) (addressing public and private forums in an offline context that 
can easily be analogized to Free Speech issues on the Internet). 
 157. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (holding a law 
criminalizing anything sold as child pornography, whether it actually was child 
pornography, to be constitutional because it did not criminalize a substantial 
amount of protected expression). 
 158. The core ideal behind the overbreadth doctrine as it applies to Free 
Speech is that “[t]he Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means 
to suppress unlawful speech” because “[p]rotected speech does not become 
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (holding that a ban on images that were neither 
obscene nor produced using actual children, such as drawings or computer 
simulated pornography, was overbroad and unconstitutional). 
 159. Id. 
 160. “[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to 
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others 
may be muted . . . .” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
Overbroad laws and the threat of their enforcement “deters people from engaging 
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bans protected speech is also likely to deter citizens from exercising 
their Free Speech rights out of fear of prosecution.161 
On the other hand, when society has deemed conduct so 
disruptive as to be criminal and a statute does have legitimate 
applications, it may be an overreaction to strike it down merely due 
to a belief that it may chill a small amount of protected speech.162 In 
an effort to balance those competing interests and to ensure that both 
are respected, the Supreme Court has insisted that a statute must be 
“substantially overbroad” to be stricken down.163 Just because a 
statute could be impermissible in some hypothetical situations is not 
enough to render it unconstitutional.164  
The overbreadth analysis has two steps.165 First, the court must 
construe the law to clarify what the statute covers.166 Second, the 
court turns to whether the statute criminalizes a substantial amount 
of protected speech,167 which is the vital question in determining 
overbreadth.168  
C. Time, Place, and Manner Restriction 
In public forums, the state’s right to limit speech and 
expression is severely constrained.169 Traditional public forums are 
areas like streets, parks, and city squares that “have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”170 The 
government’s power to curtail speech in public forums is severely 
restricted because such forums are areas where people have an 
increased right to express themselves.171 
                                                                                                             
 
in constitutionally protected speech” and inhibits “the free exchange of ideas.” 
Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. 
 161. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612; Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. 
 162. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 632. 
 163. Williams, 553 U.S. at 303. 
 164. The “‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications 
of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’” 
Williams, 553 U.S. at 303 (citing Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers 
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). 
 165. Id. at 293–97. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 297. Furthermore, one must analyze a statute not only absolutely 
but also in terms of the context and situation in which it was passed. Id. at 292. 
 168. “[A] statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of 
protected speech.” Id. at 292 
 169. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983). 
 170. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 171. Id.; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
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Courts have only twice addressed the question of whether the 
Internet is a public forum, but this inquiry is the first step in 
determining the level of scrutiny applicable to a restriction on 
protected speech.172 In Sutliffe v. Epping School District, the First 
Circuit definitively rejected the characterization of the Internet as a 
traditional public forum because of its recent creation but failed to 
elaborate any other reasons for its stance.173 In Putnam Pit, Inc. v. 
City of Cookeville, Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit took a more 
conciliatory tone regarding the issue, but it failed to entirely 
address the issue.174 Instead, the court merely concluded that one 
particular government website was not a public forum because it 
did not allow for communication, while also recognizing that the 
public forum doctrine would quickly become obsolete if not 
expanded “in times of fast-changing technology.”175 The only time 
that the Supreme Court came close to addressing the issue was in 
1997 when it commented on the Internet’s unique nature and 
potential for communicative activity.176 However, it has never 
addressed the issue directly.177 Considering the growth of the 
                                                                                                             
 172. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
799–800 (1985). The two cases in which public forums have been addressed in 
an Internet context are Sutliffe v. Epping School District, 584 F.3d 314, 333 (1st 
Cir. 2009), and Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tennessee, 221 F.3d 834, 
843 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 173. The court in Sutliffe v. Epping School District stated that 
[t]he Town’s website is obviously not a traditional public forum. Given 
that the Internet itself is a “resource[,] . . . which did not exist until 
quite recently,” the Town’s website “has not ‘immemorially been held 
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, . . . been used 
for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions.’” 
584 F.3d at 333 (citations omitted).  
 174. Putnam Pit, Inc., 221 F.3d at 843 (stating that the governmental website 
in question was not a traditional public forum because it did “not allow for open 
communication or the free exchange of ideas between members of the public”). 
However, the case also recognized that the Internet as a whole possesses a 
“communicative potential” reminiscent of traditional public forums. Nevertheless, 
the court is hindered in that analysis by the recent development of the Internet. Id. 
at 843. 
 175. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 697–
98 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring), quoted in Putnam Pit, 221 F.3d at 843. 
 176. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997). “[T]hrough the use of chat 
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, 
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.” 
Id. at 870. 
 177. The Supreme Court has only addressed the issue indirectly in a dissent:  
Minds are not changed in the streets and parks as they once were. To an 
increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and 
shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media. 
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Internet in the years since that decision, the best course of action 
would be to reevaluate traditional public forums and the 
Internet.178 
Despite the government’s restricted power to legislate 
expressive activity in public forums, the government can impose 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.179 Free Speech is a 
fundamental right, but the Constitution does not guarantee a right 
to speak about all subjects, in all places, at all times.180 The 
Supreme Court has established a three-part test to analyze time, 
place, and manner restrictions.181 To be valid, such restrictions 
must be justified by the legislature for reasons other than content, 
be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” 
and “leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information.”182 
The first inquiry is whether the restriction is content based or 
content neutral.183 Content-neutral restrictions are those that do not 
                                                                                                             
 
The extent of public entitlement to participate in those means of 
communication may need to be changed as technologies change . . . .  
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 
518 U.S. 727, 802–03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 178. Only by defining the Internet as a public forum can it gain full Free 
Speech protection, which is vital in the modern world where the Internet is one 
of the most important forms of information, education, and communication. One 
Comment examines Justice Kennedy’s dissent, explaining why the Internet, as it 
has developed in the modern world, should be treated as a public forum: 
However, the gap between Kennedy’s observation and the structural 
landscape of the Internet is that there are no “parks” or “streets” in 
cyberspace—there are no thoroughfares, no town centers, no places 
where you can stumble by and see the labor union passing out their 
leaflets or organizing the unorganized. The Internet is self-driven, self-
Googled, self-determined, and although this is part of the value of 
cyberspace, it effectively isolates each of us. Hopefully, Kennedy’s 
words will serve as the spark that will later protect spaces that sustain 
our democracy in the form of virtual public spaces.  
Stacey D. Schesser, Comment, A New Domain for Public Speech: Opening 
Public Spaces Online, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1791, 1808 (2006). 
 179. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (holding that although 
reasonable restrictions can be enforced, Louisiana’s restrictions on civil rights 
protests were unconstitutional). 
 180. Id. The Court explained the reasons for that restriction as being “[t]he 
constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of an organized society 
maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the 
excesses of anarchy.” Id. 
 181. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that 
concert restrictions in a public park were constitutional time, place, and manner 
restrictions because they were content neutral, were narrowly tailored for a 
significant governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels of 
communication). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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attempt to suppress a particular message but instead have a 
justification other than referencing the content of the regulated 
speech.184 On the other hand, content-based restrictions prohibit or 
limit speech based on its content.185 The Supreme Court has upheld 
restrictions on noise in certain neighborhoods,186 bans on camping in 
certain areas that interfered with a demonstration to call attention to 
the plight of the homeless,187 buffer zones for protesters around 
abortion clinics,188 and regulations that limited the number of adult-
themed businesses in a single building189 as content-neutral. 
Although these laws resulted in some type of speech restriction, 
none sought to ban or regulate certain messages but only the time, 
place, and manner of the speech.190 
However, determining whether a restriction is content neutral 
does not end the inquiry.191 The second question is whether the 
regulation is also “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.”192 That test consists of two components: that 
the statute serves a significant government interest and that it is 
narrowly tailored.193 Although a restriction need not be the least 
intrusive manner to be narrowly tailored, it still must not be 
substantially broader than necessary to accomplish the government’s 
goals.194 When the government’s goal “would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation, and the means chosen are not 
substantially broader than necessary to achieve that interest,” a 
statute is narrowly tailored.195  
                                                                                                             
 184. Id. (citation omitted). 
 185. Id. (citations omitted). 
 186. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the justification was to control noise 
levels to retain the character of the area in question, a goal that had nothing to do 
with the actual content of Rock Against Racism’s events. Id. at 793. 
 187. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 188. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 189. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 190. See supra Part I.C. 
 191. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796. 
 192. Id. (citation omitted). 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. at 797–99. The Court has also stated that “[a] complete ban can be 
narrowly tailored but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an 
appropriately targeted evil.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1989), quoted 
in Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–80. 
 195. Ward, 491 U.S. at 782–83. The Court stated that the regulation that 
technicians operate the sound board for all concerts was narrowly tailored 
because it was a “direct and effective” way for the city to control the volume of 
the concert. Id. at 783. It was not substantially broader than necessary because 
there was no evidence that the guideline had a “substantial deleterious effect on 
the ability of performers to achieve the quality of sound they desired.” Id. at 
801. 
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The question then becomes: When does a restriction cross the 
line between broader than necessary and substantially broader than 
necessary?196 Courts have been reluctant to lay down concrete rules 
regarding the issue, but some precedent exists.197 A regulation does 
not have to be the least intrusive way of achieving the interests of 
the government to be narrowly tailored, as strict scrutiny would 
require, but “the existence of numerous obvious and less-
burdensome alternatives is relevant to the regulation’s ‘fit.’”198 
Two cases that illustrate the difference between a narrowly tailored 
statute and one that is not narrowly tailored are Members of City 
Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent199 and 
Schneider v. New Jersey.200 In Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld 
a ban on street signs enacted for esthetic reasons over a challenge 
by those who wished to put up political advertisements, but the 
Court distinguished the previous Schneider decision banning the 
distribution of handbills.201 The law in Vincent was narrowly 
tailored because the law banning political signs was a direct 
response to the problem that the city was attempting to resolve.202 
On the other hand, the rule in Schneider was not narrowly tailored 
because the city could protect its interests by enforcing already 
existing littering statutes without abridging protected speech.203 
Federal supervised release cases are some of the only cases to 
address narrow tailoring in the context of the Internet and sex 
offenders.204 Although federal supervised release differs from 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 because it is 
individually imposed, the cases do reveal when courts have held 
                                                                                                             
 196. See id. at 801. 
 197. See, e.g., Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789 (1984); Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 
147 (1939).  
 198. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 540 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir 2008) (citation omitted) (holding that 
a ban on all signs in a private mall was not narrowly tailored because it was 
overbroad and its safety interest could be just as well served by less speech-
restrictive limits on sign sizes, shapes, or materials). The court used the factors 
from Ward v. Rock Against Racism. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 790. 
 199. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789. 
 200. Schneider, 308 U.S. 147. 
 201. Id.; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789. 
 202. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810. “[T]he ordinance in this case 
responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the 
City.” Id. 
 203. Id. at 809−10. The Court stated “that cities could adequately protect the 
esthetic interest in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely 
by penalizing those who actually litter” because “there is no constitutional 
impediment to ‘the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the 
streets.’” Id. at 808–09 (citations omitted). 
 204. Wynton, supra note 26, at 1863. Federal supervised release is very 
similar to probation or parole. The specifics are outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
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Internet bans to be narrowly tailored.205 Circuits have almost 
always upheld Internet bans in the context of crimes in which the 
offenders had sought direct contact with a minor over the 
Internet.206 Furthermore, they often consider the extent to which a 
ban would help reduce recidivism rates as one of the most 
important, if not the most important, criteria.207 
The third factor in a time, place, and manner restriction is that 
the statute must leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.208 That standard is met if a statute or regulation 
does not try to proscribe a specific manner or type of speech at a 
given time or place.209 The statute must leave open effective and 
affordable channels of communication.210 Furthermore, a statute 
may restrict an individual’s favored method of speaking,211 but it 
cannot ban an entire medium of speech212 or prohibit the speaker 
from reaching his or her intended audience.213 Other considerations 
that the Court often lists as important factors for an alternative 
channel analysis are whether the location of the expressive activity 
is important, whether spontaneity (especially for political speech) 
is possible, and the cost and convenience of alternatives.214  
                                                                                                             
 205. Wynton, supra note 26, at 1863. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth 
Circuit stated that a complete Internet ban was not narrowly tailored for any 
crime other than the direct solicitation of minors. Id. at 733. In United States v. 
Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2009), the Third Circuit upheld an Internet 
ban for a man who had paid another man to molest an 8-year-old girl while he 
watched over a webcam. One commentator has stated that “[u]ltimately, these 
[supervised release] cases recognize that some regulation of sex offenders’ 
activities is reasonable based on their past actions, but restrictions should not be 
any more excessive than necessary to prevent recidivism.” Jennifer Ekblaw, Not 
in My Library: An Examination of State and Local Bans of Sex Offenders from 
Public Libraries, 44 IND. L. REV. 919, 945 (2011). 
 208. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989). 
 209. Id. (citations omitted). The Court stated that the statute requiring all 
outside concerts to use a government-supplied sound mixer left open alternative 
channels. Id. 
 210. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 540 F.3d 957 (9th Cir 2008) (holding that banning all signage 
failed to leave open ample alternative channels of communication). 
 211. Id. at 969 (citations omitted). 
 212. Id. at 969 (“[A] regulation that forecloses an entire medium of public 
expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting fails to 
leave open ample alternatives.” (citation omitted)). 
 213. See, e.g., Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 
F.3d 1011, 1025 (2008). 
 214. See id.; City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) 
(ban on adult theaters within 1,000 feet of residential dwellings, churches, parks, 
or schools left open alternative channels because almost 5% of the city remained 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES SECTION 14:91.5 
A. Overbreadth 
Louisiana’s Unlawful Use Statute is overbroad.215 Construing 
the language and determining exactly what is banned is the first step 
when applying the overbreadth doctrine to Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5.216 The statute does not ban solely the use of 
social networking websites but, rather, the “using or accessing” of 
any social networking website, chat room, or peer-to-peer 
network—terms which are defined very broadly.217 The most 
overbroad part of the statute is Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5(C)(4)(b), providing part of the definition of social 
networking website, which bans the use or access of any website that 
“offers a mechanism for communication among users.”218 The 
definition of chat room is also overbroad; it bans websites that 
provide the “ability to communicate via text” where those messages 
can be viewed by other users.219 Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 has no exceptions for job use, job searches, family 
communication, or other important functions that the Internet serves 
in many individuals’ everyday lives.220 Due to the nature of the 
Internet, this communication restriction is only one small step below 
a full Internet ban.221  
The second factor in the inquiry is whether the statute, as 
construed, criminalizes a substantial amount of protected activity.222 
Speech over the Internet receives full First Amendment protection.223 
Because Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 bans 
communication over the Internet, and that communication has full 
                                                                                                             
 
for use by adult theaters); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1994) 
(ban on residential signs did not leave open ample alternative channels because 
even if it is content neutral, the danger of “foreclos[ing] an entire medium” is 
that “by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress 
too much speech”); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 
(1981) (holding that a complete ban on commercial live entertainment within the 
borough’s limits did not leave open alternative channels because it suppressed 
too much lawful speech); Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 
357, 370 (1997) (buffer zone around abortion clinics left open ample alternative 
channels by leaving open the ability of protesters to “‘picket, carry signs, pray, 
sing or chant in full view of people going into the clinics’” (citation omitted)). 
 215. See supra Part III. 
 216. See supra Part I.C. 
 217. See supra Part I.C. 
 218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:91.5(C)(4)(b) (2011). 
 219. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:91.5(C)(1) (2011). 
 220. See supra Part I.C. 
 221. See supra Part I.C. 
 222. See supra Part III.A. 
 223. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997). 
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constitutional protection, the statute bans protected expression.224 
However, the important inquiry is not whether the statute bans only 
protected speech but instead whether it bans a substantial amount.225 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 bans all communication 
over the Internet.226 That is not only a substantial amount of protected 
speech—it is all protected speech.227 Banning all speech is overbroad, 
even when the statute is examined in the context of the governmental 
interest it protects.228 Given that the purpose of Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5 is to keep dangerous sex offenders off of 
social networking sites that also permit use by minors, a statute that 
operates essentially as a full Internet ban with no exceptions for email, 
family contact, or job related activities is substantially overbroad and 
should be struck down as unconstitutional.229 
B. Time, Place, and Manner Violation 
The existing case law on the Internet’s designation as a public 
forum is minimal.230 Two cases have addressed whether the 
Internet should be considered a public forum, and both punted the 
issue with a textual analysis that failed to examine the Supreme 
Court’s true intent.231 The minimal case law uses history as a 
crutch to avoid a true analysis, refusing to expand traditional 
public forums beyond the physical world and into the new realms 
that technology has opened.232 However, the Internet has exploded 
in popularity in a way that those who formulated the traditional 
public forum doctrine could never have anticipated.233 The failure 
                                                                                                             
 224. Sanjiv N. Singh, Cyberspace: A New Frontier for Fighting Words, 25 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 283, 308–09 (1999). Not all speech over the 
Internet is protected. Obscene speech, fighting words, and defamation are only 
some examples of speech that is not always covered by the First Amendment and 
therefore would not be protected over the Internet in the same way that it is not 
protected in real life. Id. However, the vast majority of normal communication 
over the Internet would be protected, and, therefore, a ban on that communication 
would proscribe protected speech. See supra Part I.C. 
 225. See supra Part III.B. 
 226. See supra Part I.C. 
 227. See supra Part III.C. Although some unprotected speech may also be 
banned (obscenity, fighting words, defamation, sedition, or some commercial 
speech), that is irrelevant. The important thing to note is that a ban on 
communication proscribes all of the protected speech as well.  
 228. See supra Part III.B. 
 229. See supra Part III.B. 
 230. Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 
2000); Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 231. See supra Part III.C. 
 232. See supra Part III.C. 
 233. See supra Part III.C. 
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of modern courts to apply traditional public forum analysis to the 
Internet leaves vast amounts of speech that should be protected 
open to unconstitutional government prohibition.234  
The government should be prohibited from banning protected 
speech across the Internet in the same way that it is prohibited 
from banning free speech offline.235 Although MySpace and 
Facebook, as private entities, can suppress almost any speech they 
choose, the government lacks the same power to restrict 
expression.236 The state of Free Speech protection online is a clear 
example of how jurisprudence is a lagging indicator of the reality 
on the ground.237 The Internet has become one of the most 
important modes, if not the premier mechanism, for everyday 
people to express their views, political and nonpolitical.238 
Whereas parks and street corners formerly served as the primary 
location for people to speak, much of that expression has migrated 
to the Internet.239 People now communicate and gather on the 
Internet, perhaps even more than offline, and the definition of 
public forum should evolve with the changing times.240 To allow 
so much suppression of speech merely because it occurs via a 
recently developed medium ignores the intent behind the 
traditional-public-forum doctrine and the First Amendment 
itself.241 Traditional public forums allow people to express 
themselves cheaply and to a large audience. The Internet 
accomplishes both of those goals just as well as, if not better than, 
a park or a sidewalk.242 Furthermore, the Internet is a recent 
innovation, and its continued growth at staggering rates should not 
                                                                                                             
 234. See supra Part III.C. 
 235. See supra Part III.C. 
 236. Marlon A. Walker, MySpace Removes 90,000 Sex Offenders, 
NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 3, 2009, 10:02 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/28999365 
/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/myspace-removes-sex-offenders. In the 
past, MySpace has purged sex offenders from its website upon finding out about 
offenders’ criminal records. Private websites have full authority to control who 
can access its sites and what users can say. However, the government does not 
have the same kind of authority to limit speech as the owner of the website does. 
 237. See supra Part III.C. 
 238. See INTERNET FREE EXPRESSION ALLIANCE, http://ifea.net/ (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2011). 
 239. Id. See also INTERNET FREEDOM OF SPEECH, http://www.livinginternet 
.com/i/ip_speech.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). Even speech that does have a 
real-life component is often also expressed on the Internet, too. John Boudreau, 
Occupy Wall Street, Brought to You by Social Media, POPMATTERS (Nov. 4, 
2011), http://www.popmatters.com/pm/article/150872-occupy-wall-street-brought 
-to-you-by-social-media/. The Occupy Wall Street movement is a perfect example 
of such speech. 
 240. Boudreau, supra note 239. 
 241. See supra Part III.C. 
 242. INTERNET FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 239. 
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diminish the protection that it receives.243 Instead, the law should 
embrace the potential of the Internet to grow even more influential 
in the Free Speech sphere, and the courts should recognize the 
Internet as a traditional public forum for Free Speech analysis.244 
After determining that the Internet is a traditional public forum, 
it is necessary to apply the three-step time, place, and manner 
analysis developed by the Supreme Court.245 To be constitutional 
under that analysis, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 
must be content neutral and narrowly tailored to a significant 
governmental interest, and it must leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication.246 
The restriction in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 
and other similar statutes should be deemed content neutral 
because it does not discriminate against the content of expression, 
but, rather, it wholly bans certain persons’ speech in certain 
places.247 Although the statute targets inappropriate speech against 
minors, it attempts to reduce or stop online seduction not by 
banning that inappropriate speech itself.248 Instead, it completely 
bans some sex offenders from accessing restricted websites, 
foreclosing the possibility of any speech in those locations.249 
Some may try to argue that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 is content based because the intention of the Louisiana 
Legislature in passing the statute was to suppress certain speech 
(indecent speech towards minors) or because the law is targeted 
only at those who have previously spoken or acted illegally 
towards minors.250 Whatever its intention, the statute accomplishes 
                                                                                                             
 243. See id. Internet usage increased from 0.4% of the world’s population in 
1995 to 34.3% of the world’s population in 2012, an increase of 2.39 billion 
people in fewer than 20 years. Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD 
STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last visited March 
10, 2013). 
 244. See supra Part III.C. 
 245. See supra Part III.C. 
 246. See supra Part III.C. 
 247. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:91.5 (2011). 
 248. Obscene speech towards minors would be obscene speech. Singh, supra 
note 224, at 309. 
 249. See supra Part I.C. 
 250. If Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 were deemed to be content 
based, it would be analyzed under much stricter scrutiny than a time, place, and 
manner restriction. Content-based restrictions can be permissible in a traditional 
public forum; however, they must serve a compelling state interest and be 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citation omitted). Content-based restrictions 
receive strict scrutiny because they are more likely to be an attempt by the 
government to make a value judgment about what kind of speech is more or less 
important than other speech or because the weight of the government behind some 
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its goal in a content-neutral fashion by banning all communication 
by some registered sex offenders, the only important criteria for 
the first factor in the time, place, and manner analysis.251 
The second factor, “narrowly tailored to a significant 
governmental interest,” presents a more difficult question.252 The 
latter part is easily satisfied because few would dispute the 
assertion that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5, which is 
meant to protect minors from sexual abuse via the Internet, serves 
a significant and compelling government interest.253 The far more 
difficult question is whether Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 is narrowly tailored to that interest.254 Applying 
jurisprudential standards, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 is not narrowly tailored.255 The analysis for narrow 
tailoring is very similar to the overbreadth analysis above.256  
The Louisiana Legislature’s broad definitions in Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 do protect children, and it is 
understandable why it would define social networking sites so 
expansively.257 However, while significant, protecting children is 
not the only interest at stake.258 The constitutional rights of sex 
                                                                                                             
 
messages is improper. R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral 
Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 333, 335 (2006). When applying the content-based test to Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5, the first thing to examine is whether or not there is a 
compelling governmental interest. Protecting minors from abuse over the Internet 
is a compelling state interest. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997). Because 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 seeks to do exactly that, it would be a 
compelling governmental interest and would pass that part of the test. The second 
part of the analysis is whether it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 fails that portion of the test. Because Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 cannot pass the narrowly tailored standard for the 
time, place, and manner analysis, it would also fail the narrowly drawn standard. 
See supra Part IV. Therefore, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 would be 
unconstitutional if it were content-based as well. See supra Part IV. 
 251. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). See also 
supra Part I.C. 
 252. See supra Part III.C. 
 253. Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (establishing that the government has a 
compelling interest in protecting minors from abuse or trauma, both physical 
and mental); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353 
(2007) (“Compelling state interests are ‘interests of the highest order.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 254. See supra Part I.C. 
 255. See supra Part III.C. 
 256. See supra Part IV.A. Although narrow tailoring is separate from 
overbreadth, both in the full analysis and the fact that it is one part of a broader 
time, place, and manner test, parts of the overbreadth analysis above should be 
incorporated into the analysis of whether a statute is narrowly tailored. 
 257. See supra Part I.C. 
 258. See supra Part III.C. 
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offenders must also be respected.259 In the narrowly tailored 
determination, the important issue is whether the limitation is 
substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest.260 The restriction in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 is broader than necessary because it bans some websites 
that have nothing to do with the statute’s goal of protecting minors 
from sexual predators; however, that does not automatically 
invalidate the law.261 Instead, the key word in the inquiry is 
substantially.262 Courts have looked at the availability and ease of 
other options and the overbreadth of the regulation in comparison 
with the government’s goals.263 In the current case, there are 
numerous alternatives that would serve the government’s purpose 
without effectively banning the vast majority of the Internet.264 
Other states’ statutes offer numerous alternative definitions for 
banned websites, and many of these would likely be constitutional.265 
Although Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 seeks to keep 
sexual predators away from Internet sites where they could find and 
abuse children, it bans them from such a broad expanse of the 
Internet that it is overbroad compared to its purpose.266 Instead, 
Louisiana could follow the framework delineated in Vincent and 
Schnieder and address “the substantive evil without prohibiting 
expressive activity.”267 There are already both state and federal laws 
that ban abusive or obscene contact between adults and minors over 
the Internet.268 If the state merely elected to enforce those laws more 
strictly, it would achieve a similar result as an Internet ban without 
proscribing any protected speech.269 
                                                                                                             
 259. See supra Part III.C. 
 260. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The 
government’s interest would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, 
but that is not enough to make the statute narrowly tailored. 
 261. LA. REV. STATE. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). See also supra Part III.C. 
 262. See supra Part III.C. 
 263. See supra Part III.C. 
 264. See supra Part V. 
 265. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 266. See supra Part III.A. 
 267. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 810 (1984). 
 268. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006 & Supp. 
V 2011). 
 269. Although the existing statutes may be slightly less effective and do not 
serve the preventative function of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5, 
they infringe on constitutional rights to such a smaller extent that for many 
websites where the Free Speech potential is high and the risk of abuse low, it 
would be better to rely on statutes criminalizing unlawful contact with minors 
instead of criminalizing a sex offender’s presence on the website. LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:81 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 
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Therefore, although the statute is not required to make use of 
the least restrictive alternative, it still must fit the objective of the 
legislature in some form.270 Under current precedent, the narrowly 
tailored standard is a balancing test that combines overbreadth, 
other alternatives, and the fit of the statute and then weighs them 
against the interest of the state.271 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5 is overbroad and has too many alternatives to be 
narrowly tailored, as the Supreme Court has previously interpreted 
the term.272 
The third factor to consider is whether Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5 leaves open ample alternative channels of 
communication.273 A ban on all Internet communication, or a 
complete Internet ban, does not leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication because it forecloses the entire 
medium of Internet communication and suppresses far too much 
lawful speech.274 Only decades ago, the world existed completely 
without the Internet; people sent letters, read newspapers, and used 
encyclopedias.275 Everyone managed to live his or her life sans 
Internet; however, the world has changed.276 In modern society, the 
Internet is the most widespread and one of the cheapest ways for 
people to express themselves; very few, if any, media can rival 
it.277 Furthermore, the popularity of the Internet has made many 
things obsolete.278 Few jobs are now possible without email or 
search engines, and offline methods of political expression have 
waned due to Internet access by the masses.279 
A ban cannot foreclose all “effective and economical” methods 
of communication.280 Banning an entire medium of speech is 
impermissible, and Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 
                                                                                                             
 270. See supra Part III.C. 
 271. See supra Part III.C. 
 272. See supra Part III.C.  
 273. See supra Part III.C. 
 274. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994); Schad v. Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75–76 (1981); United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 540 F.3d 957, 968 (9th 
Cir 2008). 
 275. The Internet was only made public in 1983, and as recently as 1996 less 
than 1% of the world population were considered to be Internet users. Exhibits: 
Internet History, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, http://www.computerhistory 
.org/internet_history/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); Internet Growth Statistics, supra 
note 243. 
 276. Internet Growth Statistics, supra note 243. 
 277. See, e.g., Wynton, supra note 26. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. See also supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 280. United Bhd of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 586 v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 540 F.3d 957, 957 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Edwards v. City of 
Coeur d’Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
2013] COMMENT 917 
 
 
 
effectively prohibits all expression over the Internet.281 Furthermore, 
it is also necessary to consider whether a restriction keeps a speaker 
from sharing his message with the intended audience.282 For 
protected speech online, the audience is the adults across the Internet 
who may have an interest in the speech that affected registrants 
would deliver and those who would also like to speak to those 
affected.283 Those sex offenders affected are banned both from 
speaking and from receiving the speech of others.284 Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 effectively silences an entire class 
of people from delivering any type of speech over the Internet and 
suppresses vast amounts of protected speech.285 Furthermore, laws 
currently exist that punish those who seduce or abuse children over 
the Internet and that do not restrict the Free Speech of targeted 
registered sex offenders.286 Therefore, Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5 does not leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication. Although Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 is content neutral and serves a significant governmental 
interest, it should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is 
not narrowly tailored to the government’s interest and because it 
fails to leave open ample alternative channels of communication.287 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Having reviewed the relevant background information and 
analyzed Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5, this Comment 
proposes a redraft of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5(C), 
                                                                                                             
 281. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–55 (1994). Although Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 is not a complete Internet ban, it is a complete 
Internet-communication ban. 
 282. Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 
1011, 1025 (2008). 
 283. The intended audience for protected speech is not the children whom the 
law seeks to protect. True, the law tries to stop abuse or solicitation of minors, 
but neither of those things are protected. The speech at issue here is the other 
speech that is banned as a result of the law, not the speech targeted. See supra 
Part III.B. Because the audience in this case is everyone on the Internet who 
would come into contact with those restricted in communication, were they not 
so restricted, the nature of the Internet makes them a nebulous and hard to define 
group. However, that does not mean that there is not an audience out there with 
an interest in a legitimate message or that this law is not keeping them from 
receiving that message or from delivering their own. 
 284. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (stating that the 
right to Free Speech includes the right to receive speech from others). 
 285. See supra Part I.C. 
 286. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:81 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006 & Supp. V 
2011). 
 287. See supra Part III.C. 
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the section of the statute that defines the prohibited websites. 
Adopting this redraft would make the statute constitutional for Free 
Speech purposes.288 
C. For purposes of this Section:289 
(1) “Chat room” means any Internet website through which 
users have the ability to communicate instantaneously via 
text and which allows messages to be visible to all other 
users or to a designated segment of all other users. This 
definition does not include a website that provides only one 
of the following services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, 
message board platform, or the facilitation of commercial 
transactions.290 
(2) “Minor” means a person under the age of eighteen years. 
(3) “Peer-to-peer network” means a connection of computer 
systems whereby files are shared directly between the 
systems on a network without the need of a central server. 
This definition does not apply to peer-to-peer networks used 
only for employment activities.291 
(4) “Social networking website” means an Internet website 
which has all of the following capabilities:  
(a) Facilitates social interaction or introduction between 
two (2) or more persons for non-commercial purposes;  
(b) Allows users to create web pages or profiles about 
themselves that display names or nicknames, personal 
information, or photographs;  
(c) Are available to the general public or to any other users; 
and  
(d) Offers a mechanism for communication among users. 
This definition does not include a website that provides only 
one of the following services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, 
message board platform, or the facilitation of commercial 
transactions.292 
                                                                                                             
 288. See supra Part IV. 
 289. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5 (2011). The following statute is a redraft 
of Louisiana’s Unlawful Use statute. It preserves certain sections of the original 
statute while changing others. Changes appear in italics. 
 290. The original read: “(1) ‘Chat room’ means any Internet website through 
which users have the ability to communicate via text and which allows messages 
to be visible to all other users or to a designated segment of all other users.” Id. 
 291. The original read: “(3) ‘Peer-to-peer network’ means a connection of 
computer systems whereby files are shared directly between the systems on a 
network without the need of a central server.” Id. 
 292. The original read: 
(4) “Social networking website” means an Internet website that has any 
of the following capabilities: 
(a) Allows users to create web pages or profiles about themselves that 
are available to the general public or to any other users. 
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In the quest for constitutional alternatives to Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5, it is first necessary to identify which 
sections of the current enactment are unconstitutional.293 
Subsections (A),294 (B),295 and (D)296 of Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 14:91.5 do not pose any Free Speech constitutional issues 
and therefore are not included in this proposed redraft of the statute. 
The fact that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5 singles out 
certain sex offenders in subsection (A) should be deemed 
constitutional.297 The drafters of the law tried to apply it narrowly—
only to certain sex offenders who had previously used computers or 
targeted children in their crimes.298  
The definitions in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5(C) pose a problem under a Free Speech analysis.299 
Considering the current jurisprudence, the banned websites are 
overbroad and thus an unconstitutional infringement on Free 
Speech.300 The language employed by similar statutes in other 
states is the best place to begin analyzing the wording of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 14:91.5.301 By using concepts from other 
                                                                                                             
 
(b) Offers a mechanism for communication among users, such as a 
forum, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messaging.  
Id. 
 293. See supra Part IV. 
 294. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(A) (2011). This section discusses to 
whom the statute applies. 
 295. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(B) (2011). This section provides for a 
probation officer exception. While there are possible Due Process Clause issues 
with this section, those are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.5(D) (2011). This section discusses 
penalties for violations of the statute. 
 297. See supra Part II.B. 
 298. LA. S. JOURNAL, Reg. Sess., No. 27, at 550 (2011). See also supra Part 
II.B. Targeting offenders who have completed their sentences, especially when 
the restriction is closely related to the crime of which the felon was previously 
convicted, is not necessarily unconstitutional. 
 299. See supra Part IV. 
 300. See supra Part IV. 
 301. See supra Part I.A. Some statutes have definitions that are narrow 
enough that they do not infringe on sex offenders’ rights any more than 
necessary to protect children from abuse. Those laws focus not on the 
communication possible via the targeted website but instead create multifactor 
tests incorporating more than one aspect of social networking websites, like 
registration and profiles, making communication only one factor. Those factors 
often include basic qualities of social networking sites like a password and log-
on information, a profile with personal information, and the ability for strangers 
to view others’ profiles. Other states have also included specific lists and 
descriptions of sites excepted from the ban. Among the most important of those 
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states, as well as narrowing the definitions in Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 14:91.5, a redrafted statute would reflect only 
those sites that the Louisiana Legislature actually intended the 
statute to target (the traditional social networking sites) and would 
be much more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.302  
This Comment proposes changes to three definitions in 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5(C). The first is the 
definition of chat room in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5(C)(1). Under this redraft, it differs from the current 
definition in two minor ways.303 The previous definition covered 
every website with the possibility of communication by text that 
others could see; most of the Internet meets that definition.304 By 
adding the word instantaneously, the legislature would eliminate 
more standard websites, such as message boards, political 
websites, and news sites, while still preserving the ban on 
traditional chat rooms. The proposed legislation also has a second 
sentence at the end providing an exception for certain websites. By 
allowing sex offenders to still use chat rooms for low-risk but 
important websites, such as those used for email or commercial 
transactions, they would tailor the statute much more closely to 
those sites where children are most in danger from recidivists.305 
Those two changes would narrow the definition to cover much less 
of the Internet while still banning traditional chat rooms—often 
considered locations on the Internet where predators find new child 
victims.306 
The definition of social networking website should also be 
revised for the statute to pass constitutional scrutiny.307 This 
Comment’s proposal creates a four-factor test, and for a website to 
be restricted it must meet all four factors, not just one. Such a test 
with multiple mandatory factors focuses on social networking sites 
while still preserving access to other important sites.308 Furthermore, 
those factors add a purpose clause and restrict the types of profiles 
that are targeted. Websites that are not actually designed for people 
to connect or meet others socially would not be covered, and neither 
would sites whose “pages or profiles” do not meet certain standards 
or are not available to people beyond the consumer. The proposed 
                                                                                                             
 
include email, message forums, job search sites, and sites that facilitate 
commercial transactions between members, such as craigslist.  
 302. See supra Part IV. 
 303. See supra Part I.C. 
 304. See supra Part I.C. 
 305. See supra Part III.C. 
 306. See supra Part III.C. 
 307. See supra Part III.C. 
 308. See supra Part I.A. Statutes from some other states have taken a similar 
approach. 
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change also includes an exception clause for websites that should 
not be covered by the statute for the same reason that the definition 
of chat room contains an exception: The sites’ potential for abuse is 
reduced, and the sites are especially important for people to function 
in modern society. 
Finally, the proposal adds an exception to the definition of peer-
to-peer network. The primary situation in which peer-to-peer 
networks hold legitimate importance in modern life is the 
employment context.309 Many offices maintain networks to facilitate 
information and file sharing.310 Because job access to an employer’s 
network is also one area where there is little potential for abuse of 
children, the exception is important to maintain the rights of those 
affected by the statute while giving up very little in the protection of 
children.311 
Further additions could also benefit the law.312 More exceptions 
for work or job search related Internet activity would be greatly 
beneficial.313 The statute could also contain an exemption for 
websites that ban minors because there is minimal potential for the 
abuse of minors on a site where they are absent.314 Communication 
with family members over social networking websites could also be 
protected; however, it may be difficult for the state to confirm that 
an offender is truly only communicating with family members.315 
Making the changes proposed in this Comment would allow the 
Louisiana Legislature to demonstrate that Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 is not meant to ostracize or punish sex offenders but instead 
is purely for the protection of children.  
CONCLUSION 
As it stands today, Louisiana’s Unlawful Use of the Internet 
Statute is unconstitutional. However, that is a result of the 
overbroad wording of the definitions in the statute and not the 
                                                                                                             
 309. Definition: Peer to Peer, SEARCHNETWORKING, http://searchnetworking 
.techtarget.com/definition/peer-to-peer (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. See also supra Part III.C. 
 312. These, however, are not as important for constitutionality and would be 
more at the discretion of the legislature. 
 313. See supra Part IV.B. 
 314. This raises the problem of what it would mean to say that a website does 
not allow minors. Many websites may state that they do not permit minors to 
access their webpage but have no mechanism to confirm the age of those using 
their services. Very few websites that claim to exclude minors actually 
extrinsically check the age of their users, partly because doing so on the Internet 
is very difficult. 
 315. Wynton, supra note 26, at 1900. 
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legislature’s intent. The Louisiana Legislature is certainly entitled 
to examine methods to keep sex offenders off of social networking 
sites populated by minors, especially when the statute only targets 
those offenders who committed their crimes against children. 
However, it is unconstitutional to ban sex offenders from the 
Internet completely, or even almost completely, under the guise of 
a social networking ban. 
The government may constitutionally ban sex offenders from 
social networking sites. Because sex offenders are felons, despite 
having finished their sentences, they can be legislated against as a 
group when such an action is reasonably related to the crimes 
committed. The mere fact that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 applies to sex offenders who have finished their sentences 
and paid their debts to society does not mean that the law is 
necessarily unconstitutional. The statute targets only those who 
committed their crimes against children or with a computer; 
therefore, it is sufficiently narrow. 
However, the problem with Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
14:91.5 arises in the extent of its Internet restriction. Although 
limited situations exist in which complete Internet bans have been 
approved on a case-by-case basis for probation, parole, or 
supervised release, a complete Internet ban is overbroad and a 
violation of Free Speech. Other states have passed laws that are 
similar to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:91.5, but they 
target a much narrower slice of the Internet. A complete ban of 
communication over the Internet is unnecessary to protect children 
from sexual predators. If Louisiana narrowed the scope of its 
Unlawful Use Statute to cover only traditional social networking 
sites, the law would pass constitutional muster. Children would 
still be protected from predators in chat rooms and on social 
networking websites where they are most vulnerable.  
However, a narrower Internet ban would not leave children 
defenseless across the rest of the Internet. Instead, the state would 
have to prosecute sex offenders using already-existing prohibitions 
on the abuse of minors for some websites where the Free Speech 
potential is higher and the risk of abuse is lower. The solution to 
sexual abuse of minors over the Internet is not to violate the rights 
of sex offenders but to protect children and to discourage 
recidivism as much as possible while remaining true to the 
Constitution. 
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